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This article reviews the present state of the adoption of anti-corruption legal provisions 
usually adopted in EU (or candidate) countries in Morocco. Morocco lags behind many 
countries in its adoption of anti-corruption legislation and the recently established 
Central Agency of the Prevention of Corruption is unlikely to succeed in speeding up the 
adoption of these measures. English language translations of a number of Moroccan 
anti-corruption legal instruments are presented and amendments to these legal 
instruments are recommended (based on international best practice) in order to increase 
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In recent years, the Government of Morocco has increased its work on anti-
corruption legislation and rule-making.
1 In line with most other countries, the Kingdom 
has adopted a national anti-corruption strategy (along with national action plan) and 
established a preventive anti-corruption steering committee to oversee work on the 
national strategy.
2 However, the strategy-action plan-committee model has mainly been 
applied in Eastern European and Former Soviet countries in which legal systems had 
been changing quickly. These countries aimed to adopt the acquis communautaire and 
ratify the international conventions against corruption as quickly as possible in order to 
improve their prospects of accession (or partnership) with the European Union (EU).
3 
However, the model – when applied to countries outside the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) space – has proven ineffective and legal instruments putting the system into 
force often had to be repealed.
4 As such an institutional model of fighting corruption 
increasing becomes adopted in Arab countries, the role of legal analysis – assessing the 
current laws and evaluating whether proposed changes will be effective – will become 
particularly important (as it was for Central and Eastern European countries during the 
EU accession process). In Morocco specifically, few assessments of corruption (or anti-
corruption work) have been done – much less assessments of the legal framework in 
place aimed at enabling law enforcement agencies to fight corruption.
5  
 
This article attempts to provide an extremely rudimentary analysis of Morocco’s 
adoption of many “standard” anti-corruption legal provisions (particularly through 
comparisons with a group of “comparator countries”) as well as provide estimates of the 
costs and benefits of adopting the various provisions contained in the current anti-
corruption action plan. I describe the analysis as rudimentary because legal drafts in 
 
1 Numerous factors account for such work, including increased pressure by advocacy groups such as 
Transparency Maroc, the requirements to promote transparency as part of overall EU sector budget 
support, and upcoming $700 million in US Millennium Challenge Account funding. For a broader geo-
strategic background, see Alfred Tovias and Mehmet Ugur, Can the EU Anchor Policy Reform in Third 
Countries? An Analysis of the Euro-Med Partnership, 5 EURO. UNION POL. 4 (2004).  
2 The donor organisations – particularly the World Bank and USAID aggressively promoted this now 
widely criticised and ineffective method of structuring anti-corruption work in the 1990s. See David 
Morrissey, The Fight Against Corruption by International Organizations, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 
(2007) for an overview and for an empirically grounded critique, see Franklin Steves, and Alan Rousso, 
Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist transition countries and changes in the business 
environment 1999-2002, EBRD WORKING PAPER SERIES (2004). Perhaps one of the best and (rightly) 
scathing critiques comes from Luis de Sousa, Peter Larmour and Berry Hindess, GOVERNMENTS, NGOS 
AND ANTI CORRUPTION: THE NEW INTEGRITY WARRIORS, (2008).   
3 Such ratification has not been without its critiques, see Indira Carr, Fighting Corruption through Regional 
and International Conventions: A Satisfactory Solution? BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES WORKING PAPER 1864, 
(2006).  
4 Anti-corruption assistance financed by the World Bank in Bolivia, Georgia, Thailand, Mexico, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and other countries are examples of such programmes. However, even within the post-accession 
and ENP countries, attempts at elaborating such an institutional strategy have been criticised, see Ivan 
Krastev, SHIFTING OBSESSIONS: THREE ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF ANTICORRUPTION, (2004).  
5 Of the assessments available, most focus on political economy aspects of anti-corruption work instead of 
detailed legal work. eg. Guilain Denoeux, The Politics of Morocco's "Fight against Corruption”, 7 MIDDLE 
EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL 2, (2000).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 3 
 
                                                
French or English are difficult to obtain – thus I try to provide the reader with translations 
and specific citations to laws. As a caveat before beginning, as assessment without Arab 
law countries proves difficult due to even slower progress on anti-corruption across the 
Arab world, comparisons have been made with similar non-Arab countries.
6 The first 
section provides an extremely brief overview of corruption in Morocco for the reader 
who is not steeped in the issue. The second section makes very basic observations about 
the extent to which Moroccan legislation has incorporated the standard anti-corruption 
remedies found in the EU and most OECD member countries – focusing specifically on 
criminal law remedies against corruption. The third section discusses the new law which 
established Morocco’s strategy-action plan-committee model of anti-corruption work and 
evaluates (using cost benefit analysis) the likelihood of success in implementing the 
national anti-corruption action plan. The final section discusses the overall legal strategy 
for this (French-heritage) Arab law country as it adopts basically generally EU adopted 
anti-corruption provisions. At some point, the country will either follow the Western 
European model (which Turkey until recently has adopted which involves ad hoc 
amendment of the current legal codes) or the Eastern European model (involving the 
adoption of a single national anti-corruption law). Specific recommendations for 
amending the decree on the Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption are given so 
the Central Agency can successful lead the government to the successful implementation 
of future anti-corruption legislation (and particularly executive agency level regulation!). 
Two appendices provide English language translations of the criminal code articles about 
corruption and the decree for the Central Agency.   
 
Overview of Corruption in Morocco 
  
By many international indicators, Moroccan law enforcement agencies’ ability to 
control corruption compare favourably with similar countries. Figure 1 shows a World 
Bank indicator labelled “control of corruption” compared with the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region in general as well as with five comparators within the Arab law 
world (Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, and West Bank/Gaza) as well as four comparator 
countries outside the Arab world which have approximately the same GDP per capita.
7 
As shown in the graphic, Morocco ranks favourably with the MENA region in general 
and with all the chosen comparator countries.
8 Yet, compared to the OECD average, 
Moroccan law enforcement agencies still require a fair amount of reform.  
 
6 The comparator countries used in the analysis (Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan) have been chosen for 
three reasons. First, they are most similar in GDP per capita at PPP terms (thus excluding Turkey for 
example). Second, Morocco’s French legal heritage makes comparison with other Continental legal 
systems (including post-Soviet legal systems) much easier than with Arab country legal systems in all their 
variety and often entirely different fundamental legal values. Third, I have worked in the comparator 
countries and feel more comfortable making comparisons with them than with countries I have never 
worked in.    
7 Due to the well-known problems with the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (and 
the increasingly wide-spread use of the World Bank Governance Indicators dataset), we do not report TI 
Index rankings in this report. For critiques of various international measures, see Stephen Knack, 
Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators, 
WORLD BANK WORKING PAPER SERIES 3968 (2006).  
8 As mentioned previously, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova have been chosen as comparator countries 
mostly based on their relative similarity in GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity terms). The choice 
of comparators can naturally be criticised (as Bolivia and Vanuatu are the most comparable in GDP per QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 4 
 
 


















While the estimation of the economic value of corruption poses serious 
methodological and even conceptual problems, back-of-the-envelope estimates can be 
made. According to a survey conducted by Transparency International in Morocco, the 
“bribe tax” (or the value of Moroccan companies’ turn-over paid in bribes) hovers at 
around 5%.
9 A more realistic indicator for such a tax centres around 2% -- resulting in an 
overall impact of roughly $1.5 billion per year in bribes and other corrupt 
consideration.
10 The impact on GDP represents another $1.5 billion in growth per 
year.
11 Such estimates are in line with other studies for comparator countries; for 
example $980 million for Azerbaijan.  
                                                                                                                                                
 
While many theories of systemtic corruption exist for Morocco, the most likely 
systemic cause of corruption in Morocco stems from the exercise of clientelistic and 
patronistic relationships -- exercised by the Moroccan monarch -- leading to the 
monopolistic division of rents. Allegedly, King Mohammad VI and his entourage (the 
makhzen) sit at the centre of a large nexus of people who give favours and opportunities 
 
capita terms). The reader may use comparisons to the extent he or she feels they are helpful and ignore 
areas where such comparisons do not elucidate.  
9 CSA-TMO Maroc, SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SURVEY OF ENTERPRISES, (2001), 
[hereinafter CSA-TMO Report].  
10 The most accepted method of computing the bribe tax – as used by the World Bank – consists of asking 
companies directly, through enterprise surveys, about revenue loss as a result of bribe payments. Given that 
estimates for the closest comparator countries centre around 1% (1.5% for Ukraine and 1% for Moldova), a 
more realistic estimate for such a bribe tax for Morocco centres on 2% of turn-over. For a detailed 
discussion about the economic methodology used to estimate corruption impacts, see Bryane Michael and 
Mariya Polner, Fighting Corruption on the Transdnistrian Border: Lessons from Failed and Successful 
Anti-Corruption Programmes, TRANS. STUD. REV. (forthcoming). The estimate used 1997 Moroccan GDP 
of $152.5 billion at a real dollar-dirham exchange rate based on purchasing power parity between the two 
currencies. I pass quickly over the methodology used to obtain these estimates in order to leave space for 
the legal analysis which follows.  
11 Morocco’s GDP when valued at its “real” exchange rate with the US dollar is $152.5 billion for 2007. As 
discussed later, Sepulveda and Mendez estimate that for a country like Morocco, corruption costs roughly 
1% of GDP growth. Naturally, these statistics are illustrative rather than precise scientific micro-level 
estimates. See F. Sepulveda and F. Mendez, Corruption, Growth and Political Regimes: Cross Country 
Evidence, EUR. J.  POL. ECON. (2008).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 5 
 
for corruption in order to maintain political power and accumulate wealth.
12 Proponents 
of this argument point to the lack of legislatively defined independence of bodies 
traditionally responsible for ensuring executive accountability (such as the courts or the 
audit chamber). They also point to the large concessions over public resources controlled 
by the Mohammad VI directly or by companies under His control and the control of 
individuals personally close to His Majesty.
13 Thus, at the base of corruption, the 
underlying cause of such centralisation stems from the nature of Morocco’s Arab 
tradition legal system, where King is both the maker of law and the implementer (though 
to a lesser extent than in other Arab countries).
14 
 
The very limited evidence available seems to confirm (at least in part) the 
centralisation of corruption and the use of bribes as a method of patronage (and 
clientalism). World Bank data show that only 14% of Moroccan firms expect to give 
“informal payments” to public officials (in contrast with the 30% of the MENA region in 
general).
15 However, the average bribe paid is higher than in comparable economies – for 
example according to the data available, the average Moroccan importer paid 
approximately $2,000 in bribes for imports and another $2,000 for trade licenses 
(compared with the much lower $32 bribe in Moldova). These data suggest (at least a 
move toward) a monopolistically efficient level of bribe collection.
16 Moreover, the 
majority of respondents in the most recent survey of corruption perceptions note that 
“very important factors” leading to corruption stem from “pressure coming from senior 
officials” (about 60% of respondents) with about the same percentage of respondents 
noting that “the government is not serious about fighting corruption.”
17 While these data 
suggest Morocco is a highly corruption-ridden country, when compared with other 
countries (as shown in Figure 1), Morocco actually has a lower level of corruption than 
that predicted by its GDP per capita. Thus, the systemic aspect of Moroccan corruption 
remains elusive.      
 
                                                 
12 See G. Denoeux, Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward, MID. E. POL. 
(2007). The makhzen refers to the king’s power network or “deep state.” These allegations appear often in 
the popular press but are impossible to prove – thus the “alleged” nature of systemic corruption in the 
Kingdom.  
13 See Michael Laskier, A Difficult Inheritance: Moroccan Society under King Muhammad VI, 7 MID E. 
REV INT’L AFF. 3 (2003).   
14 I understand I am skating over an entire branch of comparative law in one sentence. However, I assume 
the reader has a basic familiarity with this general area of comparative law (Arab law) and I do not seek to 
justify this claim which I simply report others as having made. For an overview of the differences between 
the Arab and “Western” (and I use the term almost ironically given the Orientalist nature of defining a 
“Western” legal tradition), see Chibli Mallat, Comparative law and the Islamic (Middle Eastern) legal 
culture, in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimermann eds., OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
(2006): 609-639. Such a supposition is not required for any of the analysis in this paper.  
15 Perhaps as a reflection of the uncertainly over survey based corruption estimates, the CSA-TMO Report 
shows Morocco’s 65% of Moroccan companies paying bribes (albeit for Moldova, as a comparison, only 
15% of firms report paying bribes). . 
16 Schleifer and Vishny have argued that the profit maximising level of bribe collection would be observed 
in the case of a centralised bribe collector (with monopoly powers over bribe collection). The higher bribe 
“price” and lower “quantity,” along with the lower relative level of corruption weakly supports this 
hypothesis. See Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 3, (1993): 599-617.  
17 CSA-TMO Report.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 6 
 
Yet, if the centralisation of corruption rents, along with royal impunity, result in 
the high corruption in the Kingdom (at least by EU or OECD standards), a number of 
commentators have argued that these same factors have resulted in the significant inertia 
for anti-corruption reform.
18 Looking at the progress underway on the government’s anti-
corruption policy (as presented in Figure 3), such fears appear (at least at first glance!) 
unfounded. The Government of Morocco has adopted a law on asset declaration, on 
money laundering, and has committed itself to a range of activities. However, an 
evaluation of these reforms – particularly the legal reforms – remains lacking.  
 
Figure 3: Government of Morocco Assertions of Anti-Corruption Achievements in 2007 
 
According to the Moroccan Anti-Corruption strategy, the Government of Morocco asserts that they have 
completed the following edited list of activities:
19  
 
1- Consolidation of transparent government and a sense of responsibility  
 
The adoption of laws related to about the responsibility of financial directors, auditors and public 
accountants (n° 61.79), about the reasons for administrative decisions (n° 03.01), reinforcement of 
transparency in the management of public procurement (decree n° :2-98-482 of 30 December 1998), the 
updating of the penal code (article 256.1) in order to remove all penal prosecution under certain conditions, 
of whistleblowers or informants of corrupt acts, reinforcing the measures allowing for the recuperation of 
embezzled or misused funds (n° 79.03), price deregulation and the promotion of competition (n° 06-99), 
enforcing a code of covering of public credits (n° 15-97), the renewal of the fiscal system in 2000 
(reinforcing the declaration regime, reform of Customs Code and indirect taxation),  
 
2- Improvement of the conditions of access to public results  
 
Putting in place of an interactive system of determining customs excises and taxes, putting in place of 
computerised applications of fiscal management allowing for an automatisation of the implementation of 
declarations, recoveries and surveillance. Other measures include the creation of regional one-stop shops, 
the publication of a range of the most used/common administrative procedures, as well as the development 
of new information and communications technologies and the communication in the public administrations 
(creation of an e-government committee and effective launching of projects of public services online).  
 
 3- Reinforcing of the institutional cadre and prevention of corruption 
 
The creation of a High court of justice in charge of judging cases which involve the ministries, elimination 
of the Special Court of Justice (law 79.03) and the devolution of its competencies to the appellate courts of 
commun law, creation of the Ombudsman (Diwan al Madhalim) (decree of the 9 December 2001), 
establishment of regional financial courts.  
 
Source : Morocco Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
 
Policy and Legal Framework to Fight Corruption 
 
                                                 
18 In the literature, commentators often argue that countries with an Islamic legal system (or at least an 
Arabic culture such as Morocco) are less democratic and less open to government reform. For an overview 
and empirical critique, see Steven Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism, 55 WORLD POL. 1, (2002): 4-37. 
19 The reader should see the original action plan for the complete list. See ACTION PLAN FOR THE FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION, promulgated by the Ministry for the Modernisation of the Public Sector (2005). 
[hereinafter Morocco Anti-Corruption Action Plan]. I have omitted items which are non-specific and non-
relevant (using the standard methodology for assessing anti-corruption policies and action plans). As I have 
not been able to verify the government’s claims, I can not provide reasonable assurance about the report.    QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 7 
 
According to an evaluation of the laws in place, Morocco’s anti-corruption legal 
framework lags far behind several comparator countries. Morocco has neither adopted a 
consolidated anti-corruption law (which is not necessarily worrisome), nor relegated into 
its various legal codes the provisions which have come to be generally adopted world-
wide.
20 These include the traditional provisions included in most anti-corruption reform 
programmes in the 1990s (and included recently in the UN Convention Against 
Corruption) -- including the extension of the definition of corruption to cover the range of 
possible participants in corruption offences, criminalisation of corruption to all natural 
and legal persons, co-operation in mutual assistance and other provisions (some of which 
are listed in Figure 4). As shown, Morocco scores lower than any of the comparator 
countries (with a quality score of 2.4) whereas Moldova ranks 2.9, Azerbaijan 2.7 and 
France ranks at 4.6.
21  
 
Figure 4: Quality Scores of Selected Legal Provisions Related to Morocco’s Anti-
Corruption Framework*
22 










Main elements   
Criminalisation of corruption   3.2 4.4 3.9  4.7 
Anti-Corruption Strategy/Plans  1.8 3.1 3.2  4.2 
Explicit Anti-Corruption Laws  1.3 3.2 2.9  4.6 
Corruption Investigations (all jurisdictions)  1.5 2.1 1.9  4.2 
Corruption Prosecution (all jurisdictions)  2.2 2.1 2.2  3.9 
Non-domestic standing for international cases  1.2 3.6 2.9  4.9 
Other selected legal provisions 
Procedures for Financial Intelligence Unit (for 
money laundering) 
1.2 3.1 2.7  4.5 
Witness protection  2.1 2.5 2.5  4.7 
Procedure for confiscation of “illicit gains”
23  2.9 2.3 2.3  4.7 
                                                 
20 As discussed below, the new EU member states and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
countries have adopted two general strategies for anti-corruption reform: either integrating various anti-
corruption legislative provisions into a consolidated law (the Eastern European model) or ad hoc 
amendment of various branches of the legal system including criminal law, civil law, administrative law 
and so forth (the Western European model). For an overview of work done so far, see Edward Ampratwum, 
The fight against corruption and its implications for development in developing and transition economies, 
11 J.M.L.C 1, (2008): 76-87.  
21  The scale refers to the best international practice from the OECD member states. Thus, France will rate 
less than 5.0 because of other OECD members who provide better best practice.  
22 Referencing of each legal act or regulation would make the article excessively difficult to read and have 
thus been omitted. The reasons for each score would also extend potentially hundreds of pages. The Quality 
Score Method has been chosen because of its relatively wide use (Africa, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Ukraine 
and other countries). Cf  Anwar Shah and Jeffrey Hunter, Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A 
Framework for Evaluation, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 2501, (2000). Shah and 
Hunter correct choose “relevance” as one of their assessment criteria, but then choose the impossible to 
measure indicators of efficacy, efficiency and sustainability.  
23 Macedonia represents a potential comparator in which the state has the right to “tax” 70% of unexplained 
wealth. In the other comparator countries, the seizure of illicit wealth has not been tried (despite ratification 
of the UN Convention against Corruption).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 8 
 
Gifts/Favours/Abuse of Influence  3.9 3.7 3.2  3.9 
Asset Disclosure and Monitoring  1.8 2.2 2.2  3.7 
Whistleblower Protection  1.2 1.1 1.2  4.1 
Independence of Public Hiring  and Appointments  2.7 3.9 3.4  4.8 
Immunity Lifting for Corruption  2.1 3.2 3.4  4.6 
Ombudsman (public complaints unit)  1.1 1.1 1.1  4.0 
Freedom of Information  1.5 3.1 2.5  4.6 
Audits of Public Expenditures  2.5 2.0 1.9  4.7 
Public Procurement  3.7 3.9 3.9  4.8 
Business regulations  1.9 1.8 2.3  4.3 
Totals   2.4 2.9 2.7  4.6 
Source: author. The Quality Scores are based on a process known as data envelope analysis and consist of primarily an 
assessment of the specificity, relevance, completeness and goodness-of-fit of adopted legislation (and regulatory 
instruments to the extent they are available) relative to best practice within the OECD member countries. Scores are 
modified slightly to reflect their effectiveness (as reflected by any secondary sources as well as results of numerous 
interviews with the typical key informants contacted during an anti-corruption assessment mission). The scale ranges 
from 1 (least specific, relevant and close to international best practice). Naturally, as with any scoring of this kind, 
particular numerical values should be seen as guides instead of used of policy or resource allocation purposes. 
 
The most salient trend in international anti-corruption legal work in the recent 
years has been the criminalisation of corruption offences. The previously mentioned UN 
Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention 
Against Corruption represent the codification of principles which countries around the 
world are adopting as part of their anti-corruption legal framework. Figure 5 shows the 
extent to which the Kingdom of Morocco has adopted the provisions almost universally 
considered paramount to the effective criminalisation of corruption.
24 As shown, 
Morocco has only implemented 6 of the 25 standard anti-corruption provisions contained 
in many advanced developing countries’ legislation. Azerbaijan and Moldova has much 
higher adoption rates -- in part because of their membership in the Council of Europe (in 
which member states undergo regular review of the anti-corruption legislation and are 
liable for prosecution in cases brought before the European Court for Human Rights). 
Both Azerbaijan and Moldova ministries of justices are also engaged in the process of 
“harmonising” national law with the EU’s acquis communautaire.





                                                 
24 Many of these principles are contained in the OECD’s CORRUPTION - A GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL STANDARDS, (2006). For an excellent review of the legal provisions contained in the US legal 
system, cf Ashley Kircher, Brian Whittaker and Jordan Hicks, Public Corruption, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
825.  
25 The acquis simply obliges EU member states to adopt the Council of Europe and OECD conventions 
against corruption (as well as provides for extra provisions for the protection of the Communities’ financial 
interests). As Morocco adheres to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Kingdom also has the 
obligation to protect the Communities’ interests in relation to funds (such as from sector budget support 
received by the EU). Thus, the adoption of the anti-corruption acquis in Morocco should not pose, prima 
facie, a problem in the Kingdom.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 9 
 
Figure 5: Indicative Comparison of Standard Anti-Corruption Criminal Provisions
26 
 
  Morocco   Azerbaijan   Moldova 
Prohibition of active bribery (ETS 173 §2; UN §15)  X  X  X 
Prohibition of passive bribery (ETS 173 §3)  X  X  X 
Extra-territorial application (ETS 173 §17)    X  X 
Removal of immunity (ETS 173 §16)  ?  X*  X* 
Application to foreign officials ((ETS 173 §6; UN 16)    X  X 
Application to private sector participants (ETS 173 §7; 
UN §21) 
X X  X 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” (ETS 
173 §19) 
   X 
Account offences (ETS 173 §14)  ?  ?  ? 
Trading in influence (ETS 173 §12; UN §18)  X*  X  X 
Participatory Acts (UN §27)  ?  ?  X 
Scienter (UN §28)      X 
Corporate liability (UN §26)    ?  X 
Use of third-parties  X  X  X 
Prohibition against third-party beneficiaries (UN §19)    X  X 
Independence of specialised authorities      X 
Mutual assistance  ?    X 
Extradition ?  ?  X 
Direct communication between working level law 
enforcement officials 
    
Preventive agency
27     X 
Measures for protecting confidentiality  ?     
Establishment of financial intelligence unit to monitoring 
suspected money laundering offences 
 ?  X 
Embezzlement, fraud and theft by public officials (UN 
§17) 
X X  X 
Cancellation of corrupt contracts and procurements (UN 
§35) 
 ?  X 
Compensation for damages (UN §35)      X
28 
Freezing, confiscation of “tainted assets” (UN §31)  ?  ?  ? 
Confirmed provisions adopted   6/25  10/25  22/25 
Source: author. Vague or general treaty provisions (mainly applicable to UN Convention as shown in 
Figure 11) as well as non-criminal provisions have been excluded.  
* Likely to be unenforceable vis-à-vis particular legal or physical persons 
 
The Moroccan Criminal Code also contains several interesting provisions which 
are not found in many criminal codes (see Appendix 2 for an English language copy of 
the relevant articles of the Moroccan Criminal code). First, and most interestingly, 
according to article 253, a judge or jury member may be required to serve the sentence 
they hand down in a criminal case if they rendered their judgement in exchange for 
corrupt consideration. As Morocco has not yet abolished the death sentence, corruption 
can be – at least in theory – a matter of life of death of the perpetrator of the offence! 
                                                 
26 As several parts of the Moroccan legislation were unavailable at the time of this writing, I provide no 
assurance about the accuracy of the table, which is meant to provide the reader with a general estimate of 
the relative degree of the adoption of criminal sanctions vis-à-vis comparator countries.  
27 All three countries have only begun to establish such a preventative body.  
28 A recent case brought before the European Court of Human Rights (albeit against the Russian 
Federation) shows such remedies may be (at least in part) relied upon by victims of corruption.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 10 
 
of 
dministrative misdemeanours.   
 
                                                
Second, according to article 252, corruption which leads to another crime (such as a 
murder) makes the corrupt person equally responsible for the murder.
29 Third, according 
to article 250, punishment is harder (doubled) for trafficking of influence offences than 
bribery offences. Usually, the law treats the trafficking of influence as a sub-section or 
part of any definition of corruption rather than as a stronger form or exception to the 
general legal definition of corruption. As such, the doubling of punishments appears a 
rather unusual provision. Fourth, the monetary fines for participating in corrupt 
transactions are very small (between $35 to $666). In a country with a GDP per capita of 
$4600, such measures can be considered “dissuasive” (as required under article 16 and 26 
of the UN Convention).    
 
The other major area increasingly addressed by anti-corruption legislation world-
wide involves the establishment of civil liability for corruption offences. In many 
transition economies of Central Europe (and countries such as Russia and Turkey), 
parliaments and courts are increasing conferring legal rights to victims of corruption to 
sue for damages in civil fora.
30 At present, a victim in Morocco has only weak resource 
to compensation in cases involving corruption for three reasons. First, Morocco has not 
yet translated into its civil code the principles contained in the Council of Europe’s Civil 
Law Convention Against Corruption (ETS 173). While victims may choose other 
jurisdictions in trans-national cases, these victims still face considerable expense.
31 
Second, no method of determining damages exists in the Moroccan Civil Code and even 
no jurisprudence or case law may guide a judge agreeing to sit such a case. Third, 
Moroccan administrative law appears not to actively recognise sovereign or 




29 At first glance, such a provision opens the perpetrator of a corruption offence to a much sterner 
punishment than any punishment available for a corruption offence. For example, if a Moroccan border 
guard accepted a bribe to let a truck into the country without any kind of inspection (which turned out later 
to be filled with explosives and detonated in the central part of Casablanca), that border guard would 
receive the same punishment as the truck drivers and the plot organisers. Presumably, either in legal 
practice or located somewhere in the Moroccan code lies a safeguard to prevent unjust judgements from 
being handed down.  
30 Such rights entail waiving sovereign immunity (in cases where it applies as such immunities often do not 
apply when civil servants commit offences outside the “colour of the law” (to use an Americanism) in order 
to seek damages from the civil servant’s agency (for a variety of reasons which are too complicated to 
address in a footnote). Such rights also include delit (tort ) actions for third party victims of corruption 
(such as public service users who were physically or financially harmed due state non-performance of an 
entitlement or companies whose financial interests were harmed due to corruption involving their 
competitors).   
31 At the time of this writing, a company had filed an action against the Government of Romania with the 
World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on the grounds that a 
civil suit would be unlikely to succeed in Romania. In another case, the Government of the Russian 
Federation had by ordered to pay several millions to a victim of corruption in a hearing at the European 
Court of Human Rights. Given that Morocco has not been party to such claims in foreign jurisdictions 
(according to my recent Westlaw search), the lack of such claims suggests a lack of redress available to 
victims within Morocco’s jurisdiction -- even in foreign fora.  
32 I base this claim on the lack of court cases in the Moroccan court reporter as well as the lack of articles in 
the popular press about awards made against state institutions in favour of particular individuals.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 11 
 
The Anti-Corruption Agency, National Strategy and Action Plan 
 
Morocco also lags far behind other comparator countries (with the exception of 
Ukraine) in the establishment of a centralised anti-corruption agency in charge of 
overseeing a national anti-corruption strategy and action plan (to be discussed below). 
The Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (the Central Agency) precedes 
Morocco’s now abolished anti-corruption body, but in no way replaces it.
33 In November 
2006, the Government adopted a decree establishing the Central Body for the Prevention 
of Corruption (see Appendix 1 for an English translation of the decree establishing the 
Central Agency).
34 The Anti-Corruption Agency Decree establishes the widely accepted 
anti-corruption commission organisational framework for policy related to preventing 
corruption – with three separate units: a Plenary Assembly comprised of approximately 
41 members (which oversees preventative anti-corruption policy in general and is very 
heavily composed of government officials), an 8 member executive commission which 
oversees the results of the Central Agency, and the Central Agency itself (in practice the 
unit charged with the day-to-day work on preventing corruption).
35  
 



















As an inter-agency model of anti-corruption agency, the Central Agency has 
almost no legal competencies -- relying on each member of the Plenary Assembly to 
conduct particular anti-corruption activities.
36  Figure 7 shows the legal competencies of 
the Central Agency compared with similar “Article 6” structures in several comparator 
                                                 
33 The Prime Minister abolished the Special Court of Justice (or CSJ) in September 2004 – and delegated its 
powers to the appellate court system. Unlike the “preventive” competencies of the Central Agency, the CSJ 
possessed “repressive” competencies (which were often abused and most likely explains the decision not to 
delegate special investigatory or prosecutorial powers to the Central Agency). For more on the former 
Moroccan system, and other law enforcement systems in the Arab world, see Hesham Nasr, Jill Crystal, 
and Nathan Brown, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PROSECUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD, (2004).  
34 Decree on the Central Agency of Prevention of Corruption, (Decree 2-05-1228 of the 13 march 2007),   
[hereinafter the Moroccan Anti-Corruption Agency Decree].  
35 Such a design constitutes a multi-agency model of anti-corruption agency (as opposed to the universal, 
investigative, and parliamentary models). For more, see John R. Heilbrunn, , Anti-Corruption Commissions 
Panacea or Real Medicine To Fight Corruption, WORLD BANK INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf, (2007).  
36 For a comparison of this model and the outcomes in another Islamic country, cf Leslie Jacobs, and 
Benjamin Wagner, Limits to the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission Model of Corruption Reform: 
Lessons From Indonesia, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 327. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 12 
 
countries.
37 As shown, the Central Agency has relatively few competencies (2 out of the 
8 possible competencies for such an agency); placing the agency squarely in the inter-
agency category (as opposed to the universal, investigative or parliamentary categories). 
In contract, Moldova’s Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption has 
almost all the competencies expected of a universal type anticorruption agency, with 
powers of investigation and prosecution in non-criminal cases). The Central Agency is 




Figure 7: Comparison of “Article 6” Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
 Morocco  Moldova  Azerbaijan  Ukraine
39 
        
Ability to investigate     X  X   
Summary judgement on 
administrative/disciplinary cases 
 X     
Work on international cases    X  X   
Competence to carry out studies     X     
Independence from executive     
40  
Legal mandate for “awareness raising”
41 X  X     
Link with Anti-Corruption Commission  X  X  X   
Performance Audit of Government’s AC 
work 
 X  X
42  
        
Score 2/8  7/8  3/8  0/8 
Source: author. Organic laws establishing anti-corruption commissions in other Arab countries are not widely available 
online, thus no comparison could be made.  
 
In practice, like in most countries with similar agencies, the Central Agency has 
the mandate to prepare, assist with the implementation, and monitor the results of, the 
national anti-corruption strategy (and accompanying action plan).
43 The Morocco 
                                                 
37 Article 6 refers to the article in the UN Convention Against Corruption which mandates that “Each State 
Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a 
body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption.” 
38 Such costs include the roughly $24,000 salary for the staff of the Central Agency, another $30,000 in 
opportunity costs of the roughly 300,000 civil servants who will fall under the jurisdiction of the Central 
Agency (in submitting information, dealing with information requests, attending trainings, and so forth). 
For more details about the methodology used (and a comparison with the case of Azerbaijan), see Michael 
and Polner at supra note 10.  
39 Despite numerous declarations by President Yushenko about the establishment of such an Article 6 
organisation (led by the Ministry of Justice), no concrete projects of law have been released for public 
inspection.  
40 The Anti-Corruption Department under the General Prosecutor’s Office benefits from all the legally 
endowed competencies to conduct inspections, investigations, gather criminal and operative intelligence.   
41 The often-used phrase for awareness raising is not given a precise meaning in any legislation establishing 
these types of bodies.  
42 The Anti-Corruption Commission possesses the legal competence to provide opinions about the general 
government’s work on anti-corruption. In practice, the Commission has not provided an effective 
performance audit of the government’s anti-corruption work.  
43 The legal status of the national strategy and accompanying action are unclear, though unlike to represent 
real legal obligations imposed on the agencies listed in the Action Plan. In most countries, the parliament 
promulgates the action plan, making it an expression of parliamentary intent to legislation (something akin QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 13 
 
                                                                                                                                                
national anti-corruption action plan comprises two parts (general public sector wide 
provisions and sector-specific activities). In both of these two parts, activities are 
organised in groups of six areas of activity: a) the deepening of ethical and moral values 
and norms, b) institutionalising the prevention of corruption, c) reinforcing the 
transparency of public procurement, d) improving the system of implementation, control 
and audit, e) simplifying administrative procedures and f) public awareness and 
education. In comparison with many national anti-corruption action plans, the Moroccan 
Action Plan is (rightly) unambitious and relatively focused.
44   
 
Figure 8 shows each of the national action plan points and provides a back-of-the-
envelope (economic) regulatory impact analysis for each point. The major points which 
are likely to occur the government’s attention will be the asset declaration scheme, the 
money laundering law, and the public procurement law – as in most countries these 
activities involving the create of new laws and specialised agencies whereas the other 
activities involve gradual reform at the margins which rarely prove to be successfully 
implemented. Of these three major action plan points, two are expected to generate losses 
and the third a negligible social gain. An asset declaration scheme, roughly on par with 
the schemes being adopted in the former Soviet countries, would cost the Moroccan 
government approximately $23 million, yet only reduce the value of bribery by $5 
million – resulting in a net loss of $18 million.
45  
 
The public procurement reform is also likely (albeit only in the short-term) to 
generate loses of around $16 million. Given the current magnitude of Morocco’s public 
procurements (estimated at roughly 5% of GDP or $7 billion valued at purchasing power 
parity terms), the gains (in lower prices and reduced bribe payment concomitant with 
relatively closed procurements) are estimated at $15 million. However, the cost of 
implementing the reforms envisioned in the new public procurement law range around 
$31 million (including “paper work costs” of informing staff about tendering procedures, 
figuring out when purchases need to be made centrally, “disorganisation costs” of various 
types and other costs mentioned in the literature).
46 Indeed, in many cases, performance 
audits available for public institutions which adopted new national public procurement 
laws that the obligations imposed on these organisations had been violated and the cost of 
 
to a recommendation). In Morocco’s case, the strategy has been promulgated by the Ministry for the 
Modernisation of the Public Sector. Given the lack of an enforcement mechanism (or even the degree of 
detail found in most legislative acts), the action plan in unlikely to a law as recognised by EU member state 
officials.  
44 In comparison, Azerbaijan’s action plan contains 202 points! eg. Action Plan for the Implementation of 
the National Strategy on Increasing Transparency and Combating Corruption (2007-2011). As noted 
above, these generally large action plans fail to achieve their goal of reducing corruption.  
45 These calculations are similar cost-benefit analysis for Azerbaijan (which has roughly the same size of 
civil service, the same magnitude of bribery and same degree of centralisation of corruption). Moreover, 
these calculations assume that Morocco uses a risk-based method of auditing asset declarations. If the body 
in charge of auditing asset declarations tries for full coverage, the costs could be orders of magnitude 
higher! The methodology used to derive the costs of the asset declaration scheme and the expected social 
benefits as decreased in the incidence of bribe payments (as a function of decreased transaction specific 
risk of corruption) can be found at Michael and Polner at supra note 10.  
46 For example, the recent World Bank public sector reform project for Bangladesh cost roughly $29 
million (albeit for a much larger country) for two projects spanning over a 7 year period. See World Bank, 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM PROJECT I&II.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 14 
 
                                                
implementing such a policy outweighed the benefits in more efficient resource allocation, 
better quality goods and services and lower prices in the short-run.
47 However, because 
most evidence is performance audit based (instead of econometrically or time-series 
based), the gain is certain to be positive over a long enough time horizon. 
 
The money laundering law poses the greatest difficult for cost-benefit estimation 
because most of these laws are relatively new.
48 However, given the likely magnitude of 
money laundering which occurs in Moroccan banks, the first high-return steps are likely 
to produce a social benefit of $2.7 million. The Government, through a relatively 
effective money laundering surveillance, investigation and prosecution scheme, is like to 
generate $8.7 million from the discovery of illicit gains (from suspicious transaction 
declarations by complying banks) and the discovery of assets used in the commission of 
predicate offences (or during the layering or integration stages of the money laundering 
process). Balanced against such a gain is the $10 million expense involved in setting up 
the financial intelligence unit and particularly the extra compliance costs involved for 
banks – which according to the KPMG Anti-Money Laundering Survey for 2007, has 




47 For a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits with public procurement reforms undertaken by the EU 
member states during their development of a common market, see EU, A REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKETS IN THE EU: BENEFITS FROM THE APPLICATION OF EU DIRECTIVES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, (2004). The real gains, experienced only many years after member states 
started implemented the relevant EU directives, came mostly from cross-border competition which lowered 
prices and helped provide effective oversight over domestic business-government relations.  
48 The Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), despite three years of 
operation, has done relatively little in the area providing assessments of money laundering regimes in the 
region. To find which hole OECD member taxpayers throw half a million dollars into, see THIRD ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, available at: 
http://www.compliancealert.org/Linkcounter1.pdf  
49 KPMG, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY FOR 2007, Available at: 
http://www.kpmg.co.za/images/naledi/pdf%20documents/global%20anti-
money%20laundering%20survey%202007.pdf QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 15 
 
Figure 8: Overview of Moroccan Anti-Corruption Action Plan
50 
 





1- Deepening of ethical and moral values and norms  
Revision of the asset declaration law   
•  The law should cover government functions and civil servants at high 
risk of being engaged in corruption  
•  Implementation of the law should be decentralised
52 
Bill  MMSP / SGG
53  $23 million  -$18 million 
Approval of the money laundering law
54   Bill  Justice / SGG 
Interior / Finances 
$8.7 million  $2.7 million 
Approval of the law mandating public agencies comply with administrative 
court rulings
55 
Bill  MMSP / Justice / SGG  $20 million  $9 million 
Adoption of the law about government concessions and the delegated public 
service management 
Bill Finances  and 
Privatisation 
N/A N/A 
Putting into practice of institutional features of the competition law  Draft text
56  Economic and General  N/A  N/A 
                                                 
50 The English version of the action plan does not represent the official legal text and has been provided to help the English language reader understand the 
concepts contained in the plan. Estimates do NOT include opportunity costs of using state funds for other activities.  
51 Net benefit is provided, gross benefits may be calculated by subtracting the expected cost from the net benefit to obtain a expected gross benefit.  
52 The original text erroneously uses the word deconcentrated (as competencies rather than factors of production are to be devolved).  
53 MMSP refers to the Ministry of Public Sectors Modernisation and the SGG refers to the General Government Secretariat (roughly the equivalent of the 
Cabinet Secretariat). As the Action Plan does not mention the Central Agency, either the Action Plan precedes work on establishing the Central Agency, or the 
Action Plan assumes that anti-corruption work will be distributed to Central Agency member organisations and thus treats the Central Agency as a simple “pass-
through” body.  
54 I obtained total foreign and domestic assets held in Moroccan banks from Table V of the most recent IMF Article IV consultation and assumed very 
conservatively that only 0.1% of all assets are involved in money laundering. IMF estimates for money laundering world wide place the aggregate sum at $1 
trillion. Most analysts (such as the US State Department) place Morocco on the money laundering source list. The expected cost of increased regulation stems 
from the usual market imperfections concomitant with increased reporting requirements and transactions costs imposed on banks. However, as Moroccan bank 
compliance with financial regulation is lax, such costs are not likely to be large in the short-run (these costs certainly do not approach a 60% increase in banking 
costs as estimated by the KPMG survey cited earlier).  
55 Estimates of costs derive from the establishment of a system of judicial surveillance, an effective performance internal audit department in the administrative 
court sector and the creation of the legal framework which provides for immunity from prosecution for actors who act (or fail to act) in compliance with 
administrative court decisions. Net benefits result from regression estimates related to the impact of a 1% improvement in the rule of law on economic growth.  
56 The draft text (projet de texte) represents the stage before (projet de loi) and represents the drafting stage before the first reading of a bill.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 16 
 
Affairs  
Broadening competition for obtaining a public sector job  
Widening the call for applications for senior public sector jobs
57 
Executive decree  MMSP  N/A  N/A 
Putting in practice of general framework of staff rotation
58   Prime Minister 
Circular 
MMSP  $7 million  -$6 million 
2. Institutionalisation of the anti-corruption preventative strategy  
Putting in place of an organ of anti-corruption policy implementation and 
prevention
59  
Draft text  SGG  $15 million  $5 million 
Making available to citizens telephone numbers, faxes and emails for 




Unit responsible for 
follow up and 
preventing corruption  
$2 million  $8 million 
3- Reinforcement of transparency in the management of public procurement  
Adoption of text about public procurement: 
•  reinforce transparency in the processing and execution of tenders  
•  institute the advertising of tenders on the internet and their results  






$15 million  -$16  million 
(qualified) 
4- Improvement of implementation, control and audit systems 
Putting in place of a system of managerial control and establishing a 




Finances  $5 million  $10 million 
Reinforcement of accounting principles 





N/A (vague)  N/A (vague) 
5- Simplification of administrative procedures  
Putting in place of advice and information centres for citizens  about  Operational  MMSP/ Relevant  $7 million  $13 million 
                                                 
57 Public sector human resource management issues are notoriously difficult to quantify.  
58 Estimates from 3 law enforcement agencies from countries in which the experts have worked in.  
59 Estimate derives from Twinning proposal from unnamed country, US law enforcement officials working on 2 year contracts with projects in two unnamed 
countries report similar budget estimates. Assuming investigatory and prosecutorial rates increase dramatically, a large financial gain can be expected if the 
“repressive” reform is carried out quickly before targets of the reform have time to adjust.  
60 These estimates have been taken directly from customs service of a country in which one of the experts has worked.  
61 The evidence shows for the performance audits available for public institutions which adopted new national public procurement laws that the obligations 
imposed on these organisations had been violated and the cost of implementing such a policy outweighted the benefits in more efficient resource allocation, 
better quality goods and services and lower prices in the short-run. Because most evidence is performance audit based (instead of econometrically or time-series 
based), the gain is certain to be positive over a long enough time horizon.  
62 Estimates derive from EU funded internal audit projects which the experts have participated in.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 17 
 
administrative procedures   
(e-gov) 
administrations  
Information for citizens and users about the procedures via internet and other 







Obligation to publish list of procedures for public services which specifies 
documents and other requirements as well as maximum waiting times
63 
Circular of Prime 
Minister 
MMSP $300,000  $2.5  million 
Acceleration of the e-administration project  Operational 
measurement 
(e-gov) 
MMSP $7  million  $400,000 
Adoption of the draft law about electronic signatures   Bill  Economic and General 
Affairs 
$0   $0  
6- Education, awareness raising and communication
64        
Elaboration of a set of activities informing the public about current anti-
corruption measures  
Operational 
measure 
Justice / MMSP  $50,000  $-50,000 
Making of a pedagogical kit and organising awareness raising campaigns in 
educational and training establishments 
Operational 
measure 
M.E.N $15,000  $-15,000 





Integration in continuous education (training) curricula of topics related to 
professional and moral integrity  
Operational 
measure 
Relevant  ministries $5,000 $-5,000 
Communicating anti-corruption action plan and dialogue with civil society 
(associations, professional groups, etc.) about progress achieved  
Operational 
measure 
Justice / MMSP  $12,000  $-12,000 
Source: author. N/A means that documents or other studies could not be obtained upon which to make a rough “back of the envelope” calculation.   
 
 
                                                 
63 The simple benefit for the removal of transactions costs related to obtaining public services may be obtained by either calculating the hourly wage forgone of 
an individual engaged in bureaucratic procedures or the money the individual is willing to pay to forgo a particular administrative procedure (roughly $500,000). 
As shown previously, survey data show few Moroccans are willing to engage in the latter (expressing a willingness to pay money to avoid a bureaucratic 
requirement), despite a relatively high bribery incidence. These two observations comprise a general empirical puzzle in anti-corruption research and practice 
with a range of explanations which will not be elucidated in this report. The relatively large magnitude for the net benefit derives from decrease in “rent seeking” 
(use of administrative barriers in order to coerce service users to pay bribes). The estimate assumes a 1% decrease in the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
regulatory burden indicators and their effect on GDP (as measured by the previously mentioned regression analysis).  
64 Anti-corruption communication campaigns typically have a low or zero effect on bribe givers’ willingness to pay bribes (in the language of economics, this is 
measured as the elasticity of bribe incidence with respect to anti-corruption expenditure).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 18 
 
 
As these action plans have a roughly 10 year track record of implementation in 
other countries, an assessment of the specificity, relevance and “fit” of each action plan 
point can be conducted in order to determine the likelihood the action plan will succeed. 
Figure 9 compares the Moroccan national anti-corruption action plan with those of 
several comparator countries. Morocco’s action plan compares relatively well against its 
comparator countries.
65 While the Moroccan action plan is relatively un-ambitious and 
targets many areas may not be deemed as essential, the relative specificity of the action 
plan points suggests that the government policy has taken the very limited capabilities of 
the Moroccan executive into account. Despite the relatively well-conceived nature of the 
national strategy and action plan, the expected inability of the government to fund the 
plan make implementation unlikely.
66 
 
Figure 9: The Moroccan Anti-Corruption Action Plan in a Comparative Perspective 
 
 Specificity    Relevance  Goodness-of-fit Summary 
Morocco  3.7  3.2  3.8  3.4 (out of 5) 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0 (out of 5) 
Moldova  2.6  2.5  3.1  2.8 (out of 5) 
Azerbaijan  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.1 (out of 5) 
Source: Specificity refers to the extent to which Action Plan points define specifically actions to be taken 
by government authorities or other institutions (such as businesses of NGOs). Relevance refers to the extent 
to which the Action Plan point targets specifically corruption (instead of another objective like promoting 
democracy). Goodness of fit refers to the extent to which action plan points complement existing activities 
-- by promoting the completeness of the legal framework or addressing previously identified weakness 
(such as lack of provisions to conduct special investigations or controlled deliveries).   
  
Legal Strategy: East Meets West in Morocco  
 
Over the upcoming years, the Government of Morocco will need to decide which 
legislative strategy to choose as it adopts the range of anti-corruption provisions 
contained in the legal frameworks of its neighbours in the European Union (and 
elsewhere). The classical distinction between legislative strategies centres around the 
difference between Western European versus Eastern European styles. In the Western 
European model, the various anti-corruption laws (or legislative acts) are contained in 
various codes or as separate pieces of legislation.
67 
                                                 
65 While these scores may seen relatively low, anti-corruption “action planning” in general has suffered 
from vagueness, generality and lack-of-fit in many countries (particularly those whose actions plans had 
been financed by one or more international donor organisations).  
66 A well known principle in public finance states that policies should be self-funding in that they either 
raise enough revenue to cover the cost of the programme or generate sufficient improvements in social 
welfare and the business environment in order to raise tax revenue by more than the programme’s cost. As 
mentioned above, the Central Agency alone is likely to cost the government $70,000 per year with no 
appreciable income from such work. For ways which the US has used it anti-corruption work to generate 
finance for anti-corruption (particularly under its False Claims act), see Aron Petty, How Qui Tam Actions 
Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. JL REFORM 851, (2005).  
67 For a (somewhat dated) overview of anti-corruption legal work in Central and Eastern Europe, see 
EUMAP, MONITORING THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY, (2002). 
For the interesting case of Turkey (which has until recently pursued the Western European approach to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 19 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
In the Eastern European model, legislatures – with the encouragement of donor 
funding – have tried to pass consolidated anti-corruption laws. Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and other countries exemplify this approach. In the Western 
European model (of which the USA and Canada are also examples), anti-corruption 
provisions are placed in various parts of law (or the United States Code in the case of the 
USA and in various Acts in the UK). Indeed, British prosecutors relied upon the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act from 1889, while the United States “although it holds itself 
out as an example for other nations to follow, [it] does not have a coherent set of 
domestic anti-corruption laws. Instead, one can best describe the federal law as a 
hodgepodge."
68 The implicit strategy, which emerged in US law (much like former 
Soviet law), punished corruption as one instance of a misuse of public power.
69 The 
Western European approach has been seen as an organic approach whereas the Eastern 
European approach has been viewed more as an attempt to adopt rapid reform to legal 
systems in the process of “harmonising” with the EU.  
 
Figure 10 provides an overview of the laws in place. As shown, within the Arab 
world, laws against corruption only appeared (in their modern incarnation) around the 
mid-2000s – as opposed to laws in Eastern Europe which appeared in the mid-1990s. 
While the Arab states’ control of corruption is overall lower than in Central and Eastern 
Europe (as shown in Figure 1), Jordan has an extremely strong anti-corruption framework 
in place, followed by Ukraine (if one believes the Global Integrity scores). Within the 
Arab world, only Jordan appears to have put in place an anti-corruption commission 
(though data from this part of the world are extremely sparse). In contrast, Central and 
Eastern Europe appear to be proceeding quickly with the establishment of anti-corruption 




anti-corruption legislation), see Gune Okuyucu Ergun, Anti-Corruption Legislation in Turkish Law, 8 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL NO. 9, (2007)  
68 See Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: a Comparative Analysis of International Corruption 
Conventions and United States Law, ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793 (forthcoming), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=298089 at 798). 
69 William A. Clark & Philip H. Jos, Comparative Anti-Corruption Policy: the American, Soviet and 
Russian Cases, 23 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 101 (2000). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 20 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of Selected Provisions of Anti-Corruption Legislation in EU Neighbourhood and Arab states
70 
 
  Central Law  Criminal Law  Central Agency  GI score 
Arab Countries 
Algeria  Law No. 06/01 for the 
prevention and the fight against 
corruption from 20 February 
2006 
Title 4, Article 25, Section 1 
& Article 52. 
Inspection générale des finances (IGF), a division within 
the Bank of Algeria (Executive Decree No. 92-32 of 20 
January 1992 Ministry of Economy JO N° 6 du 26 Janvier 
1992).  
59 (very weak) 
Egypt  NO  Penalty law no. 58/1937, 
second book on the crimes and 
offenses damaging general 
welfare (articles 103-111). 
No central agency, but laws establishing Government 
auditor (Law no. 144/ 1988), agency against illegal profit 
(Law no. 2/1977), law on administrative prosecution (Law 
no. 117/1958),  
69 (weak) 
Jordan  Law of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission # 62 of 2006 
Article 5 
Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and 
Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 
1993 
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission #62 of 2006  94 (very 
strong) 
Comparator Countries 
Moldova  Law on Corruption and 
Protectionism (No.900 of 
27.06.1996) 
Art.188/1 of the Penal Code 
(November 24, 1961)  
 
Law on the Center for Combating Economic Crimes and 
Corruption (CCECC) (No.1104-XV of 06.06.2002) 
67 (weak) 
Ukraine  The 1995 Law on Fighting 
Corruption and "On urgent 
measures to Deshadow the 
economy and counteract 
corruption" (# 1615/2005). 
Part 17 of the Criminal Code  The most recent incarnation of this agency appeared in 
early 2008 with another presidential declaration. The 
National Security and Defence Committee has legal 
authority of anti-corruption.  
79 (Moderate) 
Azerbaijan
71  On Combating Corruption, (13 
January 2004) 




Law on the Anti-Corruption Department under the General 
Prosecutor 
70 (Moderate) 
Source: Global Integrity. Lebanon omitted due to problems with Global Integrity’s assessment.  
 
                                                 
70 For some reason, Global Integrity does not assess Morocco.  
71 Global Integrity does not report the 1994 Anti-Corruption Law for some reason and misses the Law on the Anti-Corruption Department under the General 
Prosecutor. The Global Integrity reviewers are attributed too much weight to Ukraine’s legal framework, seriously over-estimating the “strength” of the country’s 
anti-corruption framework.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 21 
 
The Government of Morocco must choose a legislative approach – as simple 
ratification of the international anti-corruption conventions would be relatively useless 
without a ratifying legislation defining with more precision the various provisions 
contained in these conventions. The UN Convention Against Corruption represents an 
example of an international conventions with relatively vague provisions (as the OECD 
Convention and the Council of Europe conventions are more specific). Figure 11 
reproduces an analysis (using the same assessment methodology as above) for each of the 
provisions contained in the UN Convention. As shown, the Convention contains a 
number of highly general or abstract admonitions which could represent drafting flaws -- 
or much more likely, the result of political comprise about a text which would be ratified 
by over 150 UN member states. Given the general nature of many of the UN 
Convention’s articles, specific legislation (or at executive agency regulation) is required 




In some cases, legislation can be adopted which quickly, “where appropriate and 
in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system,” the provisions of the 
UN Convention.
72 For example, article 8 requires signatory states to adopt codes of 
conduct while article 9 requires low corruption-risk public procurement procedures. In 
both cases, a number of countries have passed legislation implementing these provisions 
– article 8 usually appears as part of the Civil Service Act or the Anti-Corruption Law 
while article 9 appears as the public procurement law. In other cases, regulation within 
particular law enforcement agencies best implements the broad objective contained in the 
UN Convention. For example, article 10(b) encourages states to adopt “simplifying 
administrative procedures, where appropriate, in order to facilitate public access to the 
competent decision-making authorities.” In this case, most ministries promulgate specific 
                                                 
72 The phrase “where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system” 
appears 33 times in the Convention, highlighting the importance of further legislative work in adopting the 
principles contained in the Convention. At present, many countries have simply passed a 2-3 line legislative 
act (being published in the Official Bulletin) stating that the country ratifies the UN Convention Against 
Corruption.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 22 
 
instructions (from the head of the agency or service) instructing staff to publish particular 
information on the internet. Especially in this area, Moroccan legal scholars and 
practitioners have much work to do.   
 
Some of the priority areas for legislative reform have already been listed in Figure 
4. The criminalisation of corruption needs to include all the physical and legal persons 
mentioned in the various international conventions. The number of non-criminal 
prosecutions (through the civil courts and in disciplinary proceedings) needs to 
significantly increase.
73 In matters of international co-operation, Morocco needs a “one-
stop shop” which other countries’ prosecutors and investigators can go to when looking 
for evidence pertaining to cross-border corruption cases involving Moroccan citizens or 
companies. The national police, gendarmerie, customs and border guard should also 
institute corruption risk assessment methods and strengthen internal security (or internal 
affairs units) by devolving greater powers of investigation and prosecution (in cases 
which appear to involve non-criminal responsibility) – probably requiring a prime 
ministerial decree due to the cross agency nature of such rule-making.
74  
 
As the Moroccan government has chosen to exclude any investigatory or 
prosecutorial powers from the Central Agency, the Central Agency should be charged 
with performance and compliance audits of the government’s anti-corruption 
programmes and policies.
75 The Central Agency should be independent of the 
government (in the present decree, the Prime Minister at present nominates staff and 
approves major Agency activities such as the publication of the annual report).
76 Such 
internal audit should produce recommendations which are binding on parties (or at least 
produce recommendations which executive agencies must by law respond to). Specific 
changes to the present decree (which can be found in Appendix 1) are provided below in 
Figure 12.  
 
                                                 
73 For a discussion of the “growing pains” involving in adopting such provisions (in a common law 
context), see John Hatchard, Recent Developments in the Laws on Corruption and the Regulation of 
Conduct in Public Life: Implications for Law Teachers and Legal Research in the Commonwealth, 4 J. 
COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL ED. 2, (2006): 137 – 155.  
74  The executive wide adoption of such provisions poses interesting legal questions related to the 
delegation of authority to engage in anti-corruption law enforcement functions. The easiest solution 
comprises the adoption of a national anti-corruption law which devolves authority for internal security to 
executive agencies (and subject to the legislative framework already in place and particularly paying 
attention to the protection of both citizen and civil servant rights).   
75 Such an organisation would help bring Morocco to the same standard as other developing countries 
(particularly in the European Neighbourhood Policy region) which are implementing a system of internal 
audit. In effect, the present proposal would establish something akin to the US Inspector General system 
(but only focused on looking at the efficiency and effectiveness of anti-corruption).  
76 In almost all EU member states, the anti-corruption commission or agency is guaranteed independence 
form the government. For example, the 2005 Croatian Law on the Office for the Suppression of Corruption 
and Organised Crime does not directly provide for the independence of the office (the USKOK), but 
establishes it under the State Attorney’s Office (which is an independent entity). By contrast, the 2004 
Azeri Law on the Department on Combating Corruption under the General Prosecutor’s Office does not 
provide for the independence of the agency (as the General Prosecutor is appointed by the President).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 23 
 
 
Figure 12: Summary of Changes to the Central Agency Decree 
  
The Central Agency Decree should be amended as follows:.  
 
Preamble – add “the agency shall be independent from the Prime Minister and any other state authority, 
have the right to use the state seal and establish relations with foreign institutions within its competence.”  
 




Article 2 – add after the extensive list of organisations “from the above list, civil society organisations must 
represent at least 60% of the institutions in the Plenary Assembly.”  
 
Article 3 – remove the requirement that the Prime Minister approve of the Agency’s president and make 
nomination of the President based on majority vote of the Plenary Assembly.  
 
Article 4 – add “the Central Agency shall conduct anti-corruption performance and compliance audits on 
state bodies with anti-corruption competencies whose recommendations shall be legally binding (or at least 
require the targeted institution to reply to the recommendation as is standard IAASB practice).”  
  
Article 6 – add “the report should consist of an audit of anti-corruption activities and conform to IAASB 
standards” and add “the publication of the report on the Internet may be made at the Central Agency 
President’s discretion and need not incorporate any amendments made by the Prime Minister’s office or 
any other government entity.  
 
Article 8 – add “minimum requirements for participation in the Plenary Assembly and the Central Agency 
shall include: a) the member is not under suspicion of engaging in corruption by any Moroccan law 
enforcement body, b) an obligatory fraud audit of their statutory asset declaration, and c) the President of 
the Central Agency shall have attended a course in performance and compliance audit (preferably with an 
anti-corruption focus) as well as attended at least one internationally recognised anti-corruption course.  
 
Article 10 – add “appointment should be as majority vote of the Plenary Assembly” and remove the 
provision requiring Prime Ministerial appointment.  
 
Article 14 – add “managers who fail to provide the Agency President with information shall be either: a) 
sanctioned according to the disciplinary measures outlined in the Civil Service Law (or code regulating the 
ministry where applicable), and/or b) the manager’s department be fined $200 for failure to comply.”  
 
Article 15 – remove requirement for Prime Ministerial approval of the Agency’s structure and working 
methods.  
 
Article 16 (extra article) – add “The Central Agency shall be allowed to seek redress on behalf of the 
government for instances of corruption in Morocco’s civil courts (and administrative courts when wrong-
doing involves public sector entities). In order to ensure the proper use of such authority, the Article 16 
shall expire every two years, and be renewed upon favourable opinion rendered of an independent 





                                                 




Morocco’s adoption of legislation focused on preventing corruption lags behind other 
similar countries (though its actual control of corruption rates higher than would be 
expected for a country of its level of economic development). In this respect, Moroccan 
anti-corruption efforts reflect the same trends as in other Arab legal systems. Thus, 
Morocco – in order to reduce corruption -- will thus either need to adopt an anti-
corruption law or pass legislation making modifications to its criminal, civil and 
administrative codes (in line with EU member state experience). The recent decree on the 
Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption provides a step in the right direction, 
though design flaws will require an amendment to the decree in order to make the 
Agency more effective by giving it the power to conduct performance and compliance 
audits (among other things). Such an Agency, if designed effectively, would be able help 
with the adoption of the wide range of other laws and regulations (many of which follow 
EU best practice). The result of the wide range of legislative reforms should be, if 
international experience serves as a guide, long-term expected reductions in the $1.5 
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Appendix 1: Decree 2-05-1228 of the 13 march 2007 instituting the Central Agency 
of Prevention of Corruption 
 
The Prime Minister 
 
Noting the Constitution, notably article 63; 
 





Article 1 – The Prime Minister establishes a Central Agency of Prevention of Corruption, hereafter named 
the “Central Agency” 
 
For the purpose of the present decree, corruption consists of all the acts related with the traffic of influence 
or the use of public power for private gain, as they are defined in the penal code.
79  
 
Dispositions related to the Central Agency
80 
 
Article 2 – The Central Agency shall co-ordinate, supervise, and assure the implementation of policies 
aiming to prevent corruption in the public sector as well as collect and publicise information about these 
policies.
81   
 
To this end, the Central Agency is charged with: 
 
- proposing to the government general policies related to preventing corruption, particularly involving 
co-operation in the fight against corruption between the public sector and the private sector, 
 
- proposing measures of awareness raising among the public and organising information campaigns 
aiming at preventing corruption,  
 
- contributing, in co-operation with the public administration and other concerned organisations, to the 
development of international co-operation in the area of preventing corruption,  
 
- assuring the implementation and the evaluation of measures taken in order to implement government 
policy in the area of preventing corruption as well as addressing recommendations to the 
administration, public organisations, private enterprises, and other organisations which are involved in 
making policies related to preventing corruption,   
 
- giving advice to administrative authorities about measures which can be taken to help prevent acts of 
corruption in the public sector,  
 
- collecting all information related to corruption and managing such information in a database, 
 
- informing the competent judicial authority about facts likely to constitute acts of corruption as 
defined and punished by the law.  
 
                                                 
78 Islamic dates are not given in this translation  
79 The original text defines “detournement et concussion” without providing a formal definition of 
corruption. As such, I have tried to provide a definition which is likely to be in the penal code (though as 
the penal code is also not easily available in French, I have had to make a supposition based on 
international common practice in defining corruption offences.  
80 Subtitles added to assist reader organise concepts in the decree 
81 These policies presumably are defined in the national anti-corruption strategy and action plan.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 26 
 
Article 3 – The Central Agency shall be composed of a Plenary Assembly, an Executive Commission and a 
General Secretary.  
 
The Central Agency shall be presided over by an individual known for his or her competence, experience 
and probity, nominated by the Prime Minister for a non-renewable period of 6 years.  
 
Dispositions related to the Plenary Assembly 
 
Article 4 – The Plenary Assembly shall be charged with: 
 
- proposing to the government a national strategy for preventing corruption, as well as proposing 
mechanisms to adopt in order to reduce corruption, 
 
- recommending to the private sector measures to take to prevent corruption,  
 
- giving advice to administrative authorities about measures which are likely to prevent acts of 
corruption,  
 
- defining the Executive Commission’s work programme,  
 
- evaluating activities undertaken to prevent corruption 
 
Article 5 – The Plenary Assembly, which shall be presided over by the president of the Central Agency 
shall consist of, besides Ombudsman (Wali-Al Madhalim): 
 
I – a member designated by each of the government authorities changed with: foreign affairs, interior, 
justice, habous property and Islamic affairs, public finance, the secretary general of the government, 
agriculture and fishing, employment, education, equipment and transport, health, communication, 




II – a representative from each of the following professional organisations: the association of the order 
of Moroccan lawyers, the represent of the federation of chambers of commerce industry and services, 
the notorial chamber, the national order of adouls, national order of accounting experts, general 
confederation of Moroccan enterprises, professional Moroccan banking group, the trade unions most 
representing workers, the association the most representative among those cited in the second bullet 
point section of the III point thereafter, and the national union of the Moroccan press.
83 
 
III. The following associated members: 13 members nominated by the prime minister as follows: 
- six members of civil society chosen for their activity in the fight against corruption 
- three members of the associations working in the area of preventing corruption 
- four members chosen among researchers-teachers known for the competence in the area of the fight 
against corruption. 
 
The members of the plenary assemble shall be named for a duration of 4 years, renewable only once.  
 
The Plenary Assembly may also include within its membership any person who can contribute to its work.  
 
Article 6 – The Plenary Assembly may be convoked by the government for any question related to 
corruption. 
 
                                                 
82 Habous refers to a definition of property in Islamic property law whereby such property has restricted 
rights of sale and transfer in order to preserve the property for familial or social use. Habitat et urbanism 
has been defined as housing and urban affairs.  
83 Adouls refer to notaries as recognised under Islamic law.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 27 
 
The Plenary Assembly shall present an annual report about its work in preventing corruption and progress 
on previous recommendations to the Prime Minister.  
 
This report should consist of proposals made to the government about preventing corruption as well as 
include an evaluation of the actions taken.  
 
The Plenary Assembly shall publicise this report and provide for its publication. The Plenary Assembly 
shall be responsible for sending a copy of the report to the Minister of Justice. The Plenary Assembly may 
also publish all studies, advice or proposals in relation to the prevention of corruption.  
 
Article 7 – The Plenary Assembly shall meet at least two times per year or by the request of the majority of 
its members,  
 
The president of the Central Agency shall establish the Plenary Assembly’s meeting agenda, in 
conformance with the objectives assigned to the Plenary Assembly as per article 2 above. The Central 
Agency’s president shall submit this agenda to the Plenary Assembly.
84  
 
The Plenary Assembly shall be quorate when two-thirds of its members are present. The Plenary Assembly 
shall take decisions by the majority vote of present members. In case of a tie, the president’s vote decides 
the vote’s outcome. If the meeting is inquorate, the Plenary Assembly shall meet after one calendar month.  
 
Dispositions related to the Executive Commission 
 
Article 8 – the Executive Commission shall be in charge of implementing, under the authority of the 
Agency’s president, the tasks assigned to the Central Agency and shall assure the implementation of his or 
her decisions and recommendations.  
 
To this end, the Executive Commission shall:   
- centralise and process information related to acts of corruption brought to the attention of the Central 
Agency and inform the judicial authorities about these acts when these acts are likely to constitute acts 
of corruption punishable by law,  
- establish and update a database related to corruption,
85  
- develop actions which help co-ordination work aimed at preventing corruption between relevant 
administrative bodies,  
- establish communication strategies and organise public awareness and information campaigns about 
preventing corruption. 
 
Article 9 – The Executive Commission shall constitute, beside the president of the Central Agency, eight 
members chosen by the Plenary Assembly, in conformance with article 15 below. 
 
The members of the Executive Commission shall include: 
- four members designated by the government authorities defined in the first section of article 5 above,  
- two members of the professional organisations mentioned in the second section of article 5 above, 
- two members of the associations mentioned in the third section of article 5.  
 
Dispositions related to the General Secretary 
 
Article 10 – The president of the Central Agency shall be assisted by a Secretary General which shall be 
nominated by the Prime Minister. 
 
                                                 
84 No deadlines are given in the original text. Presumably, the president of the Central Agency is required to 
submit this agency within a certain time before the Assembly’s meeting. 
85 The original text refers to a database about the “phenomenon of corruption” which may refer to particular 
cases, to general theories and principles of corruption or other aspects of corruption. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 28 
 
The Secretary General shall manage, under the authority of the Central Agency president, the Central 
Agency’s administrative functions, and shall conduct any work required for the preparation and 
organisation of Central Agency’s work activities, 
 
The Secretary General shall be responsible for the maintaining and storing Central Agency files and 
archives. He or she shall serve as the rapporteur during Plenary Assembly and Executive Commission 
sessions.  
 
Final dispositions related to the Central Agency 
 
Article 11 – in order to fulfil its legal obligations, the Central Agency’s president may call upon experts 
and external service providers. 
 
Article 12 – regional or local commissions be created by the president of the Central Agency, as necessary, 
who determines its composition and attributes, after agreement by the Plenary Assembly. 
 
Article 13 – the Central Agency’s personnel are all required to maintain the confidentiality of any acts of 
corruption and information in which acquire during the course of their work, except for information 
included in the annual report as required by article 6 of this decree.
86  
 
Article 14 – the state administration and the administration of local collectivities must provide the Central 
Agency’s president, upon his or her demand and by the deadline he or she gives, any documents or 
information, in conformance with the legal dispositions and regulations in force.  
 
Article 15- The Central Agency’s structure, activities and working procedures shall be determined by a 
regulation to be elaborated by the Plenary Assembly and submitted for the Prime Minister’s approval.   
 
Article 16- The Central Agency’s finance for daily operations and equipment shall come from the budget 
of the Prime Minister’s office. The Central Agency’s president shall oversee and manage all Agency 
budgetary revenues and expenditures.  
 
Article 17 – The present decree will be published in the Official Bulletin, executed in Rabat on the 13 
march 2007.  
 
Driss Jettou  
 
 
                                                 
86 Presumably Moroccan law defines official state secrets and intelligence to be kept by law enforcement 
agencies which determines the types of information which may be included in the annual report. The decree 
does not make reference to external laws or rule-making.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 29 
 




Section IV: Offences related to Corruption and the Traffic of Influence
87 
 
Article 248: Applicable persons.
88 For the individuals listed below,
89 whoever shall solicit or agree to 
offers or promises (of rewards), and whoever shall solicit or receive gifts, presents or other advantages shall 
be guilty of corruption and imprisoned from 2-5 years and fined between $35 to $666 US dollars: 
90 
 
1. judges, civil servants or persons holding an elected position – for a) acting or refraining from acting 
in his or her functions, justly or not, b) for activities which should not be remunerated; or c) for an act 
which is, or could have been, facilitated by the person’s public sector job or function,
91   
 
2. mediator or nominated expert (whether appointed by an administrative or judicial authority or by the 




3. judge or a member of a jury -- decide either in favour or against a party,  
 
4. doctors, surgeons, dentists, midwifes -- falsely certify or hide the existence of illnesses, handicap, or 
pregnancy; or give deliberately false medical opinions about the cause of an illness, handicap or cause 
of death.  
 
Article 249: Definition of Offences. Civil servants, candidates for civil service positions, or any person 
receiving any form of government remuneration, shall be guilty of corruption and imprisoned from 1-3 
years as well as pay a fine of between $35 to $666 US dollars: 
 
a) if that person (either acting directly, through a third-person and unbeknown to and without the 
consent of his or her superiour)  
b) solicits, agrees to, offers, or promises gifts, presents, commissions, discounts, or mark-ups (whether 
they were actually received or not), in order to  
i) engage in -- or refrain from -- an act related to his or her civil service job or  
                                                 
87 The following represents a teleological translation of the original French text. As such, punctuation has 
been added which may aid the English language reader with the text. The authors of the French text have 
constructed the sentences using a number of predicate phrases, indirect verbs and run on sentences which 
would make a simple reading of the text extremely difficult. As such, the reader may not rely on this 
translation and should either consult the original French text or seek a literal translation of the text. For a 
brief explanation of the various methods of legislative, regulatory and other legal interpretation, see 
Marmor (2005).  
88 Article sub-titles are provided to allow the reader to scan the section quickly to look for the main idea 
and are not included in the original.  
89 Naturally, this introductory phrase does not appear in the original and has been added to assist the reader. 
The inclusion of such phrases not continue to be footnoted and the reader should consult the original text in 
case of doubt.  
90 The original text refers to 250 to 5,000 dirhams. As this translation will be used for a report which will 
age quickly, the dollar translation has been provided. As Morocco (like most countries) is now 
experiencing a period of inflation, the fixed fines in the Code will certainly need to be indexed to inflation.  
91 The original text refers to « un acte qui, bien qu'en dehors de ses attributions personnelles, est, ou a pu 
être facilité par sa fonction. » I have removed the phrase “outside of [or aside from] its personal (natural) 
attributes” as the phrase is unclear (to me) in this context. The extensive use of numeration and letter bullet 
points stems from excessive use of predicate phrases in the original French.  
92 As the context of Section 248(1) involves the exercise of public functions, it sub-section presumably 
does not cover frauds perpetrated in private dispute resolution.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 30 
 
ii) participate in an personal act aided by his or her civil service job.
93  
 
Article 250: Trafficking influence. Any person shall be guilty of trafficking influence and will be 
punished from 1-5 years of prison of shall pay a fine of between $35 to $666 US dollars, who:  
a) solicits, agrees to, offers or promises (corruption consideration),  
b) solicits or receives gifts, presents, or other advantages, in order to obtain or attempt to allow himself or a 
third-party obtain : 
i) awards, medals, distinctions, or monetary awards,  
ii) places, functions, employment, or favours (however awarded by public authorities),  
  iii) tenders, companies
94 or other profits resulting from agreements which are:  
1) concluded with government entities,  
2) with a state-controlled or regulated administrative body  
iv) or generally any favourable decision from a particular authority or administrative body (and 
thus abuse his or her influence either in practice or in appearance).  
 
If the guilty party is a judge, civil servant or elected official, the punishment shall be doubled.
95  
 
Article 251: Provision for indirect corruption. Whoever, in order to obtain an administrative act or the 
forbearance of an act, which is: 
i) one of the favours or advantages defined in articles 248 to 250 
ii) obtained from actual deeds or the threat of an action,  
iii) obtained from promises, offers, gifts or presents, or other advantages 
iv) or given from solicitations for a corrupt transaction  
even if: 
1) the participant did not initiate the corruption transaction  
2) the constraint or corruption had not produced the desired result  
will be punished in the same way as the person found guilty of corruption.  
 
Article 252: Traffic of influence offences. In the case where corruption or the traffic of influence aimed at 
commission of another crime (as defined by the law), the party who is guilty of corruption or the traffic of 
influence shall be liable for criminal prosecution (and the ensuing punishments) for the resulting crime.
96  
 
Article 253: Reflection of sentencing. When corruption involving a judge or a member of a jury in a 
criminal case results in a guilty verdict against the accused, the punishment shall be applied to the above 
mentioned individual(s) who participated in the act of corruption.
97  
 
Article 254: Personal judgements. Any judge or administrative official who decided in favour of a party 
or though personal dislike against a person, shall be imprisoned for 6 months to 3 years and pay a fine of 
                                                 
93 See 4. I have dealt with the problematic phrase by resorting to “a personal act” 
94 the receipt of a company is a problematic translation of the original – I have no answer to the this 
dilemma other than to flag it for the reader.   
95 Presumably the doubling of punishments only applies to Article 250, as other punishments are defined 
for judges, civil servants and elected officials later in the text. The net effect results in a greater punishment 
of the trafficking of influence than bribery, and a greater punishment for the civil servant than the private 
sector participant (violating equality before the law?). 
96 While the article clearly establishes the “pass-through” of criminal liability for the successor offence, the 
article does not make clear the applicable punishment (certainly not as clearly as Article 253 below). No 
provision is made for predicate offences.  
97 Morocco has not yet abolished the death penalty. The extent of such as “reflection” of invalid sentencing 
on judges remains to be tried in a Moroccan court. The original text refers to judges, members of juries or a 
“membre d'une juridiction.” In most texts, the jurisdiction is question is defined (civil, jurisdiction of a 
particular court, etc.). This text simply refers to a “member of the jurisdiction” and thus I have deleted this 
reference (as this is not a literal translation). The same applies to article 248(3) above.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS178  Page 31 
 
                                                
between $35 and $133 US dollars.
98  
 
Article 255: Confiscation of “tainted” assets. Items (or the value of those items) which have been 
transferred in a corruption transaction shall be confiscated and transferred under the control of the state 
treasury upon receipt of the appropriate judgement.
99  
 
Article 256: Lesser Offences. In cases in which the judge applies misdemeanour or non-criminal 
punishment, the convicted party may lose one or more of the rights mentioned in article 40 of this code for 
a period lasting from 5 years to 10 years; he or she may be banned from public sector employment for 10 






98 The original text is asymmetric in that it mentioned unfavourable rulings resulting from antipathy but not 
favourable rulings stemming from sympathy.  
99 The translation of this point has required a theory of property rights (that the Treasury has the right to 
hold non-monetary assets) and that a court order is required for such a confiscation. The French text simply 
notes that the Treasury gets the items (or their value)... “by judgement.”  